Regulatory Surveillance by TC Didn’t Identify Vessel Modifications that Affected Stability and Watertight Integrity
The installation of freeing ports during a refit on the undecked Captain Jim’s hull is what led to the fatal sinking of the vessel in Halifax Harbour in the early morning hours of Jan. 29, 2019, concluded a Transportation Safety Board (TSB) investigation released last fall and corrected in February.
“After the publication of this report, the TSB obtained information indicating that Transport Canada (TC) had returned to the Captain Jim in July 2008 following the refit,” reads the correction.
“Although the contractor installed the freeing ports on the Captain Jim and identified the plan to do so to Transport Canada (TC), neither party completed an assessment of the possible safety implications of shipping more water on the deck than the bilge pumps were capable of removing. This meant that the contractor was unaware of the adverse effects that the freeing ports had on the Captain Jim’s stability. If vessel modifications are not adequately assessed for their safety implications, there is a risk that those modifications may unknowingly compromise a vessel’s stability, affecting the safety of the vessel’s crew and passengers.”
The TSB Watchlist has been amended to indicate that regulatory surveillance by Transport Canada did not identify that the vessel had been modified in a way that affected its stability and watertight integrity.
The Captain Jim’s freeing ports were added during a vessel refit in 2008 and were modelled on freeing ports that had been approved for the Lady Shirleen’s refit. However, during the Lady Shirleen’s refit, the vessel was modified from an undecked vessel to a decked vessel. This meant that the Lady Shirleen’s buoyancy was provided by the volume of watertight hull below the watertight deck; the addition of freeing ports above the watertight deck did not affect its watertight integrity, says the investigative report.
By contrast, as an undecked vessel, the Captain Jim relied on freeboard provided by its watertight hull for buoyancy and stability. Without the freeing ports, the Captain Jim’s freeboard extended to the top of the gunwale.
However, when the freeing ports were added, the vessel’s average aft freeboard was reduced from 0.9 metres to approximately 0.1 metres. The addition of freeing ports to the Captain Jim’s hull reduced the vessel’s freeboard and rendered it vulnerable to water ingress. The Captain Jim was an undecked vessel, and so any water that entered through the freeing ports accumulated on deck, passed down through the non-watertight hatches in the deck and entered the vessel’s bilge.
At the time of sinking, the Captain Jim was enroute to Eastern Passage, returning from an oil tanker that was anchored in the approaches to Halifax Harbour. The vessel captain, deckhand and one passenger were on board. The deckhand was injured.
At some point on the return voyage to Eastern Passage, unbeknownst to the crew, sea water began entering the vessel through an open freeing port. The amount of water that entered the hull exceeded the capacity of the bilge pumps and flooded the area below the deck, reads the report.
With the deckhand injured, the master did not have a crew member to assist with troubleshooting the water ingress or plugging the aft scuppers.
“The master’s decision to attempt to return to calmer waters was influenced by his many years of experience at sea. However, this experience did not provide him with the technical proficiency needed to fully understand the stability implications of the water ingress and therefore appreciate the urgency of the unfolding situation,” says the report.
“As the voyage continued, the unmitigated water ingress resulted in water overwhelming the vessel’s engine and batteries, which caused the bilge pumps to stop working.
“Without operational pumps and inherent buoyancy and with the aft scuppers open, the vessel continued to take on water and gradually sink by the stern until the weight of the water exceeded the buoyancy of the vessel and the vessel sank rapidly.”
One crew member and the passenger managed to board the vessel’s life raft and were rescued by a Halifax Harbour pilot boat. Divers recovered the body of the other crew member inside the vessel’s wheelhouse later that day.
“Because the vessel sank rapidly and the crew were in the wheelhouse, there was insufficient time for everyone to abandon into the life raft; as a result, the passenger entered the water and the injured deckhand drowned,” says the report.
The investigation also looked at decision making, safety management and regulatory surveillance as part of the occurrence.
“Safety management and regulatory surveillance are Watchlist 2020 issues. As this occurrence demonstrates, if a vessel operator’s processes for managing safety are missing key elements and there is no requirement for a formal audited safety management system, there is a risk that vessels will be unknowingly operated in a manner that compromises the safety of those on board,” says the report.
“The issue of regulatory surveillance will remain on the Watchlist until Transport Canada provides more oversight of the commercial vessel inspection process by demonstrating that its surveillance and monitoring are effective in ensuring that authorized representatives and recognized organizations are ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements.”
The TSB said, following the occurrence, the company changed some policies related to crewing and vessel operation, including ensuring that only certified personnel operate its vessels. It also now requires that its vessels be inspected and function-tested on a quarterly basis.
The TSB is an independent agency that investigates air, marine, pipeline and rail transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.
