For more than a decade, The Navigator’s May issue has focused on the inherent dangers faced by commercial fishermen today, as well as the practices and technology aimed at making it safer.
As has been the practice for the last number of years, The Navigator’s editorial has opened with the names of local fishermen that have tragically died at sea during the last year. Our collective thoughts and prayers go out to the family and friends of:
- Scott Dicks
- Allen Baker
- Phil MacInnis
- Trevor Childs
- Nicholas Skinner
- Jerry Holland
According to the most recent statistics from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), in 2023, a total of 1,031 marine transportation occurrences (accidents and incidents) were reported to the TSB, a decrease of 15 per cent from the previous year.
Of these occurrences, a total of 237 were marine accidents (199 shipping accidents and 38 accidents aboard ship), a slight decrease from 2022 (244), and eight per cent below the five-year average (258). A total of 66 of these accidents involved commercial fishing vessels, a decrease from the previous year (74) and below the five-year average (82).
Nine of the 237 accidents were fatal, resulting in 18 fatalities. A total of 10 of these fatalities were from five accidents within the Canadian commercial fishing industry.
Additionally, 794 marine incidents were reported, which is a decrease from 2022 (968) and below the five-year average (925). Most reportable incidents (80 per cent) were categorized as “total failure of machinery or technical system.”
While these statistics are somewhat encouraging, there is always room for continuous safety improvements. While some in the industry continue to take a somewhat lackadaisical approach to safety on the water, it is always good, once in a while, to highlight a positive story where a culture of safety leads to fishermen returning home to their families safely.
One such example is the loss of the fishing vessel Elite Navigator and the fate of the “Lucky Seven,” as they are now known.
On July 8, 2024, the Elite Navigator, with the master and six crew members on board, departed Valleyfield, Newfoundland and Labrador, to fish turbot. By July 17, the vessel had caught its quota. At approximately 1830, the master used a satellite messenger to notify the owner that they were on the way to port to land their catch and that their estimated arrival time was 1430 on July 18. At this time, the vessel was about 137 NM east-northeast of Fogo Island.
According to the official TSB report, at approximately 1930, an alarm sounded in the wheelhouse. The master checked the alarm panel and determined that it was from a smoke detector in the engine room. The master looked at the video camera that monitored the engine room, but there was no smoke visible. The master then went to one of the engine room access hatches in the deckhouse and proceeded partway down a ladder into the engine room to check for smoke. Light smoke was now visible. Shortly after, a crew member in the deckhouse yelled that there was a fire in the exhaust trunking.
Another crew member grabbed a dry powder fire extinguisher and tried to extinguish the fire through the interior doorway to the exhaust trunking. Meanwhile, the master returned to the wheelhouse and shut down the main engine. The master and one of the crew members then went outside on the main deck and pried the exhaust trunking vent off the back of the deckhouse to get access to the other side of the exhaust trunking. From here, they continued to try to fight the fire with another extinguisher.
The attempts to fight the fire with the extinguishers were not successful and the master told the crew to prepare to abandon ship. He instructed them to get the immersion suits from the wheelhouse and bring them to the muster station on the aft portion of the main deck.
The master returned to the wheelhouse and activated the digital selective calling (DSC) button on the vessel’s very high frequency (VHF) radiotelephone to send a distress signal. He watched the VHF DSC count down and heard it beep, indicating that the distress signal was sent successfully. He then made two Mayday calls by voice over the VHF radiotelephone. The master then went to the top of the wheelhouse and threw the two life rafts into the water.
In the meantime, one of the crew members grabbed five immersion suits, the most he could carry, from the wheelhouse and brought them to the muster station. He donned an immersion suit and proceeded to the top of the wheelhouse to inflate the starboard life raft by pulling the painter.
Two of the crew members became trapped forward as the fire grew, and they were unable to go aft to the muster station. One of these crew members sent another Mayday call by voice over the VHF radiotelephone. The two trapped crew members then tried to retrieve immersion suits and life jackets from the wheelhouse but were unable to do so because of smoke and fire. They exited the wheelhouse to the bow.
After donning immersion suits, the master and the four other crew members jumped into the water. The wave heights were one to three metres and the visibility was poor with patchy fog. The master and two crew members swam to the life raft and boarded it, while two crew members stayed in the water in their immersion suits. One group held onto the life raft and helped manoeuvre it by kicking, while the other swam to the bow where the remaining two crew members were stranded without immersion suits or life jackets.
One of the crew members on the bow jumped into the water. He was pulled him over to the life raft and lifted on board. The other crew member on the bow also jumped into the water. Using the life raft’s painter, he was pulled over to the life raft and boarded it. One of the crew members in the life raft then cut the painter to release the life raft from the burning vessel. At this time, embers from the vessel fire were burning holes in the life raft’s canopy.
At approximately 1938, the master and crew members began manoeuvring the life raft away from the burning vessel. As the life raft began to move away, the remaining crew member was pulled on board. The other life raft, which was uninflated, was visible drifting away from the Elite Navigator. The master and crew members tried to paddle to retrieve it but could not reach it. Shortly after, the Elite Navigator and the uninflated life raft drifted out of view.
Approximately 6.5 hours later, the life raft with the master and crew members on board drifted back in sight of the burning vessel. At this time, the superstructure and deck were completely burnt. The vessel sank shortly thereafter.
At 1521 on July 18, the owner, concerned because the vessel was overdue and there had been no recent communication or social media activity from the master or crew, called Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) to report the situation. MCTS attempted to contact the Elite Navigator on VHF and medium frequency (MF) radiotelephone but was unsuccessful in reaching the vessel. MCTS determined that there had been no signal from the vessel’s automatic identification system since 2030 on July 17. The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre was notified and, at 1535 on July 18, resources from the Canadian Coast Guard and Department of National Defence were deployed.
On July 19, after more than 50 hours in the life raft, the master and crew saw a helicopter and the lights of a vessel nearby and set off their last flare. The helicopter spotted the life raft and shortly after, at 2328, the Canadian Coast Guard ship Teleost rescued everyone from the life raft. All seven crew members on board survived with only minor injuries — the “Lucky Seven” indeed.
In its report, the TSB stated that investigations into such incidents often find evidence of weak safety cultures on commercial fishing vessels; however, in the case of the Elite Navigator, the vessel carried more safety equipment than was required by regulation and the master and crew members were in the practice of talking through emergency scenarios and responses. They also demonstrated concepts from safety training during the occurrence, in particular their use of lifesaving equipment.
The vessel carried seven life jackets and seven immersion suits; some were stored in the forecastle and some in a locker in the wheelhouse. The vessel also had two eight-person inflatable life rafts stored in cradles on top of the wheelhouse. The life rafts were fitted with hydrostatic releases and were connected to the vessel by painters. The life rafts were each equipped with paddles as well as an emergency pack that included water, sugar biscuits, flares, thermal protective aids, a sponge, and a bailer.
If any fisherman out there now needs a lesson in the importance of appropriate safety gear and training, just speak with one of the “Lucky Seven.”
